We show that exported products exit the US market sooner if they violate the Heckscher-Ohlin notion of comparative advantage. Crucially, this pattern is stronger in case of exporting countries with a well-developed banking system. External debtholders thus push …rms away from exports that are facing an uphill battle on a competitive foreign market due to a suboptimal use of the domestic factor endowment. These results imply a disciplining role for external debt in terminating ine¢ cient trade ‡ows. Our paper thus constitutes a new channel through which …nance improves resource allocation in the real economy.
Introduction
One of the most distinguishing features of economies or economic systems is their di¤ering ability to allocate the available resources in an e¢ cient way. Maybe surprisingly, the sources and consequences of resource misallocation have only recently come to the fore of the macroeconomic and development literature ( 1 This new line of research usually focuses on the signi…cant heterogeneity of marginal products or rates of returns to production factors within economies. Another important aspect of resource misallocation has so far not caught much attention: export patterns not congruent with the comparative advantage of a given country. Our paper tries to …ll this gap. It also examines the role of …nance in attenuating this kind of factor misallocation. Producers often export products that violate the notion of comparative advantage, sometimes because of subsidies and other distortionary policies of their national governments. In the long run, factor and product markets will eventually force out the ine¢ cient exporters, but this can be a lengthy process and in the meantime social costs occur. We provide evidence for disciplining e¤ects of competitive product markets, but primarily examine the role of external debt as an additional check on ine¢ cient exporting. Speci…cally, this paper looks at the ine¢ cient exporting patterns through the lens of the agency theories from the …nance literature. Protracted exporting of a product not corresponding to the comparative advantage is rarely a pro…table activity in the long run. However, managers sometimes pursue projects with negative net present value because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Debtholders can serve here as an external disciplining device, preventing managers to invest into poor projects (Jensen 1986 , Stulz 1990 , Hart and Moore 1995 . Consequently, a well-developed domestic …nancial system could help to push the country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.
We empirically test this prediction by examining the export survival of di¤erent products from di¤erent countries on the US market. According to Heckscher-Ohlin theory, exporters should specialize in products whose factor intensity coincides with the factor endowment of their country. Our results con…rm that the larger is the distance between exported product's revealed factor intensity and exporting country's factor endowment, the sooner the product exits the US market. Highly competitive product markets in the United States thus force out exporters who fail to optimally use the resources available in their country. Crucially, the products whose factor intensity puts them at comparative disadvantage exit the US market even faster, if the exporting country has a high share of bank credits to GDP. Our evidence therefore suggests that a strong banking sector can prevent a sub-optimal use of resources by enforcing an e¢ cient export composition before a competitive foreign market does so. 2 The paper makes two main contributions. First, it introduces a new channel through which …nance improves resource allocation in the real economy, extending the existing work of developmental and …nancial scholars. Exports violating the notion of comparative advantage represent an important and rather underresearched facet of resource misallocation. Moreover, the existing work on misallocation su¤ers from the lack of internationally comparable production data at the level of highly disaggregated goods. In contrast, the richness of available trade data permits a detailed and thorough empirical analysis of resource misallocation in a broad sample of countries. As for the …nance literature, it has traditionally focused on capital misallocation and its consequences for economic growth (Lang et al. 1996 , Wurgler 2000 . The Heckscher-Ohlin theory compares the overall factor intensity of a product with factor endowment of the exporting country. This framework therefore allows us to examine the role of …nance in the wider context of resource allocation. Manova et al. 2009 ). This recently growing line of research shows that …nancial development improves the export performance of a given country. Finance especially bolsters exports of …rms that come from …nancially vulnerable industries or face credit constraints. These are important results, but their implications for overall allocative e¢ ciency might yet prove elusive. What if …nancially constrained …rms specialized in products whose factor intensities match poorly with the endowment of a given country? Financial development could in this case just reinforce ine¢ cient exporting patterns with adverse allocative consequences. In contrast, our results imply that …nance helps the …rms on the "right side" of the comparative advantage.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we combine the agency approach from the …nance literature with the intellectual framework of trade theory. This will provide motivation for our choice of data and estimation strategy presented in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 brie ‡y discusses some policy implications and concludes.
"Free Cash Flow" Problem and International

Trade
The perquisites of many managers increase with the level of investment undertaken by their …rm or organizational unit. This gives them incentive to invest even in projects with negative net present value projects, if the …rm has cash ‡ow exceeding funding needs of positive net present value projects. Jensen (1986) stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert this "free cash ‡ow"into unpro…table investments. Basically, the threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward e¢ cient use of available resources. The ultimate insiders like managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" …rm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. Shareholders not happy with the dividend payments usually do not pose such a severe and immediate threat to the entrenched managers.
From a broader perspective, the free cash ‡ow theory is a prominent example of the agency approach in …nance literature. Agency theories view managers as rational agents pursuing their own objectives. Consequently, managers' actions can contradict the interests of the owners or society as a whole. Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995) build upon the insights from Jensen (1986) and develop formal models about the disciplining role of external debt. Lang et al. (1996) and Wurgler (2000) focus on capital misallocation and provide empirical evidence along the lines of Jensen's theory. Our paper utilizes the agency approach to look at another important aspect of resource misallocation: exporting not congruent with the comparative advantage of the domestic economy.
Exporting activities are in our view particularly prone to the free-cash problem of managerial discretion. Business related to foreign markets involves both high level of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. A long-term success in exporting requires considerable investment. It is not enough to build and maintain distribution channels in a foreign country. A …rm often needs to adapt its whole production routine and marketing strategy to a di¤erent market, regulatory and cultural environment. These investments will be e¢ ciency-enhancing if they lead to more trade and international division of labour in compliance with the principle of comparative advantage. However, rational managers might have an incentive to push also for ine¢ cient exports that do not match with their country's factor endowment.
A product manager can surely expect some additional perks if the …rm sells "his" product also on foreign markets. Similarly, export status of a …rm would be certainly not harmful for the status and bene…ts enjoyed by the …rm's top management. The export-driven perquisites for managers can range from travelling abroad and spending time at luxury hotels to gaining a better access to domestic politicians who are eager to create national export champions. Managers might even retain rewards from exporting activities after a switch to another employer. Mion and Opromolla (2011) …nd a 15% wage premium for managers who have previously worked for an exporting …rm. Interestingly, they do not …nd such a premium for export experience in case of non-managerial employees.
Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards ine¢ cient exporting. These subsidies could be (and often are) justi…ed by the adverse e¤ects of …nancial frictions on potential exporters. In the presence of capital market imperfections, even promising …rms might fail to secure up-front …nancing necessary for successful expansion into foreign markets. However, looking at the export promotion through the lenses of agency approach highlights possible costs of government intervention. Export subsidies represent additional funds at managers' disposal that can worsen the problem of free cash ‡ow. 4 For example, management can spend the government's funds for broad export promotion like establishing distribution networks or various marketing and public relations activities. Once the …rm has set up this general export infrastructure, managers can use it to promote also products that match poorly with the country's factor endowment.
The example of export subsidies shows how combining the idea of comparative advantage with the insights from agency literature allows a more precise inference for allocative e¢ ciency than in the standard …nance-trade literature. We do not ask whether …nance promotes exports of all credit-constrained or …nancially vulnerable …rms. Our focus is rather on the allocative and selective role of external debtholders: Do they mitigate the resource misallocation by pushing the manufacturing sector towards exports congruent with the comparative advantage of a given country? To our knowledge so far only Berman and Héricourt (forthcoming) examine the selection role of …nance with respect to exporting. They show that …rm's productivity is an important determinant of export decision only after some threshold of …nancial development is reached.
Another bene…t of our approach relates to endogeneity prevalent in the relationship between …nancial factors and export performance. Greenaway et al. (2007) …nd no evidence that …rms with better ex-ante …nancial health are more likely to enter foreign markets. They do, however, …nd strong evidence that …rms'…nancial health improves once they start exporting. This result poses serious challenge for studies examining whether …nancial development promotes exports of …nancially vulnerable …rms. Berman and Héricourt (forthcoming) o¤er a partial solution to the problem, by looking at …rm's productivity rather than just its …nancial health. However, subsidies or political connections could still a¤ect both productivity and export performance of a …rm. By contrast, the product's congruence with the comparative advantage of the exporting country is a technological characteristic. It measures the extent to which the product's manufacturing process uses up factors corresponding to the endowment a given economy. Presumably, neither the various political factors a¤ecting export performance nor the export performance itself will alter the capital or labour intensity of a product.
The remaining conceptual issues concern the choice of appropriate proxies for the prominence of external debtholders in a given country and for the product's export performance. The original paper of Jensen describes the US reality and focuses therefore on the disciplining e¤ects coming from the holders of corporate bonds. However, the argument goes through for all debtholders. The main source of debt …nancing in the most countries are …nancial intermediaries like banks. This is especially true for …rms in developing countries where the risk of resource misallocation is the most severe. The disciplining role of …nancial intermediaries might be especially important in numerous developing countries that su¤er from insu¢ cient judicial quality. Banks rely in pursuing their rights on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In contrast, minority investors usually put much heavier burden on the legal system when trying to enforce their rights (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . In this paper, we therefore focus on banks and use the terms external debtholders and …nancial intermediaries interchangeably.
Regarding the suitable measure of export performance, we opted for products' survival on the US market. In our opinion, a proper analysis of resource (mis)allocation requires a structural, long-term perspective rather than short-term, mercantilist point of view. Speci…cally, this paper uses the concept of comparative advantage and examines whether a well-developed …nancial system promotes products with good long-term prospects at the costs of the products whose exports are not sustainable in the long run. The product's survival on foreign markets is a natural measure of export sustainability. Our focus on the long-term optimality of resource allocation leads also here to a departure from the previous literature. The existing literature on …nance and trade usually does not address the issue of export survival. When it does, the focus is on the short-term year-to-year changes in the export status of products or …rms (Manova 2008 , Berman and Héricourt forthcoming).
The formal survival analysis used in this paper also enables a closer look at the interplay between the disciplining forces of product markets and …nancial intermediaries. External debt is not the only way how to bridge a gap between managers' decisions and the social optimum. It is the product markets that impose the ultimate constraint on managers using available resources in an ine¢ cient way. Answering the question whether external debtholders improve upon the disciplining forces of product markets requires an export proxy shaped by these forces in the …rst place. Long-lasting competitive pressures will arguably have a signi…cant impact on the long-term survival of products on foreign markets. In contrast, a mere product entry to foreign markets can be the consequence of government interventions in exporting countries. Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008) show that export promotion works mostly via extensive margin. This is also in accordance with the stated objective of export agencies. 5 However, most countries do not have enough resources to subsidize exports of non-competitive products inde…nitely. At some point the competition on foreign markets will set in, making the products' export survival the most appropriate proxy in this context. This line of argument also dictates the choice of the United States as destination market. The product market in the USA is arguably the freest and the most competitive among the rich large economies.
To sum up, combining the agency approach with the concept of comparative advantage allows for examination whether …nance promotes exports in a way that improves the resource allocation. It also mitigates some endogeneity concerns when compared to the existing literature on …nance and trade. Moreover, focusing on the export survival in a highly competitive US market permits a closer look at the interplay between disciplinary forces of domestic …nancial intermediaries and foreign product markets. We consider this interplay an issue of utmost importance. Competitive pressures on product markets represent namely a rather slow disciplining tool. Signi…cant social costs associated with ine¢ cient use of resources occur in the meantime (Jensen 1993) . Showing that …nancial factors can improve upon this standard disciplining device would therefore be a novel and important result from the allocative point of view.
The next two sections present in more detail our choice of data and estimation strategy.
Data
Distance to Comparative Advantage
From the data point of view, the main challenge is to identify products that do not correspond to the comparative advantage of the exporting country. Our proxy for the extent to which a product uses inappropriate factors of exporting country is the distance to comparative advantage (distance ck ), computed at the 6-digit level of the HS classi…cation. Following Cadot et al. (2011), this index compares the revealed factor intensity of a given product with the factor endowment of a given country.
Cadot et al. (2011) cite the recent literature on diversi…cation cones (Schott 2003 (Schott , 2004 Xiang 2007 ) as a conceptual basis for their measure. However, the theoretical foundations for measuring distance between exported product's factor intensity and exporting country's factor endowment were laid down much earlier.
According to a long-standing idea called chain of comparative advantage, ranking the products in order of their factor intensities can explain international trade in multiple commodities. In a two-country model, the relative factor endowments determine which end of this product chain comprises exports of a given country. Deardor¤ (1979) extends the idea to a more realistic world of multiple products and multiple countries. In this higher-dimension case, the chain of comparative advantage e¤ectively breaks into several segments, one for each country. Countries are arranged along the chain in accordance with their relative factor endowments, with each country exporting the products within its own segment and importing all the others. 6 Omitting the time index, the formula for the Euclidean distance of product k to the comparative advantage of country c for any given year writes:
where c and h c are endowments of physical and human capital of country c, and k ,ĥ k ; are the corresponding revealed factor intensities of product k, all in log terms.
We di¤er from Cadot et al. (2011) in using the normalized di¤erences between the product factor intensities and the country factor endowments, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. This assures equal weights of physical and human capital in the overall distance, as and h are measured in di¤erent units.
The data on national factor endowments are from Cadot et al. (2009) . The stock of physical capital per capita is constructed according to the perpetual inventory method. Human capital per worker is calculated from the average years of schooling in a country, using attainment data.
The product revealed factor intensities of product k are from Cadot et al. Balassa (1965) . This modi…ed formulation ensures that weights add up to one:
The revealed human capital intensity of product k is calculated in a similar way, with h c being the endowment of country c with human capital:
Other variables
As our theoretical motivation stresses the disciplining role of external debtholders, we use the private credit to GDP as a proxy for country's …nancial development (F D c ). The data are from the widely used database by Beck et al. (2000), which contains various indicators of …nancial development across countries and over time. The annual data for GDP per capita is taken from the World Development Indicator report 2006, and is reported in constant 2000 US dollars. Financial development and GDP per capita are correlated at 61%.
In our analysis, we control for the fact that …nancial development may facilitate export survival by reducing the costs of external …nance to exporters. We use the interaction between …nancial development and external …nance dependence. Industry-level measure of external …nance dependence for ISIC 4-digit sectors comes from Raddatz (2006) and is based on …nancial data about US …rms from Compustat. In particular, dependence on external …nance is de…ned as capital expenditures minus cash ‡ow from operations, divided by capital expenditures, for the median …rm in each industry.
Similarly, we interact exporting countries'endowments of physical and human capital with corresponding factor intensities at industry level. The factor intensities for ISIC 4-digit sectors come from Romalis (2004) . Human capital intensity is computed as the ratio of non-production workers to the total employment in each industry. Physical capital intensity is measured as 1 minus the share of total compensation in value added. Both factor intensities are then adjusted to re ‡ect the share of raw materials.
We compute the export survival in the US market and the remaining productrelated variables from the BACI 8 dataset developed by the CEPII and described in Gaulier and Zignago (2009) . The dataset provides harmonized bilateral trade ‡ows for more than 5,000 HS 6-digit products and 143 countries, over the 1988-2005 period. In the following, we focus on the 1995-2005 period due to the high number of missing values before 1994, and consider only exports of manufactured products and tobacco to the USA. 9 Export ‡ows are reported annually in values (US dollars) and quantities. This highly detailed level of information is particularly suitable for survival analysis. Aggregation could introduce a considerable bias, essentially hiding individual export failures at the product level.
The product-related variables include the value of export in US dollars in the initial year of the trade relationship, (initial_export ck ), in log terms. This re ‡ects the level of con…dence US importers have in the reliability of their trading partner. Additionally, we include the total export value of product k from country c in the initial year of the trade relationship, (total_export ck ), in log terms. This variable captures the experience the exporting country has in supplying the world market with product k. We also control for the degree of competition for a given product on the US market, incorporating the number of countries exporting product k to the USA in the initial year of the trade relationship, N Suppliers k . Finally we account for trade relationships with multiple spells, including a multiple spell dummy that takes value one if the spell is a higher order spell, multiple_spell ck .
Our …nal database contains 71 countries exporting to the USA (see Appendix A).
Empirical Strategy
This paper investigates the disciplining forces of external debtholders and foreign product markets with regard to the long-term misallocation of resources. For this reason we have opted for the empirical framework of survival analysis. This allows us to focus on the long-term sustainability of trade relationships, rather than examining the short-term year-to-year changes in export ‡ows. In our case, the duration of a trade relationship represents the number of years during which country c exports product k to the USA without interruption. In other words, it captures how long such a product survives on the highly competitive US market. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation is not suitable for duration data, as the survival times are restricted to be positive and thus have a skewed distribution. Survival analysis allows an examination of the relationship between the distribution of survival times and some covariates of interest. The survival function gives the probability that a trade relationship will survive past time t. Conversely, the hazard rate function, h(t), assesses the instantaneous risk of demise at time t, conditional on survival till that time. Formally, let T 0, denote the survival time (length) of a trade relationship, with covariates X. The hazard rate, h(t), is thus given by:
Alternatively, in discrete time:
h(tjX) = Pr(T = tjT t; X); t = 1; 2; :::
The Cox Proportional Hazard Model
We estimate the hazard rate for our trade relationships data using a Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) model (Cox 1972) . The Cox PH model is broadly applicable and represents the most widely used method for survival analysis. The hazard function for a given product k exported from country c with covariates X = fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::x j ; ::x n g,
is de…ned as the product of a baseline hazard function, h 0 (t), common to all observations and a parametrized function exp (X: ) with a vector of parameters :
The form of the baseline hazard function characterizes how the hazard changes as a function of time. The covariates X a¤ect the hazard rate independently of time.
The model o¤ers some convenient features. It makes no assumptions about the form of the underlying baseline function. Additionally, the relationship between the covariates and the hazard rate is log-linear, allowing for a straightforward interpretation of the parameters. Increasing x j by 1, all other covariates held constant, a¤ects the hazard function by a factor of exp( j ) at all points in time. It shifts all points of the baseline hazard function by the same factor. Parameter estimates in the Cox PH model are obtained by maximizing the partial likelihood as opposed to the likelihood for an entirely speci…ed parametric hazard model (Cox 1972 ). The resulting estimates are less e¢ cient than maximum-likelihood estimates. However, the model makes no arbitrary, and possibly incorrect, assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard function.
Empirical Speci…cations
We use the Cox proportional hazard model to analyze the export duration of product k from country c to the USA. This enables us to investigate whether competitive US market and …nancial development in exporting countries shape export survival according to the idea of comparative advantage. The empirical model writes:
where F D ct 0 is the level of …nancial development in country c and distance ckt 0 is the Euclidean distance of product k from comparative advantage of exporting country c. A positive estimated coe¢ cient 1 would indicate that products not congruent with the comparative advantage of the exporting country face a higher hazard rate in the competitive US market. A positive coe¢ cient 2 would suggest that strong …nancial intermediaries reinforce this pattern, e¤ectively pushing the export composition towards the comparative advantage of a given country even before the competition in a foreign market sets in. Controls ckt 0 represents a vector of control variables, including the direct e¤ect of …nancial development (F D ct 0 ), and " ckt 0 is the error term. All time-varying explanatory variables are measured in the initial year of the trade relationship t 0 . In the subsequent sections, we simplify the notation and omit the time subscript t 0 .
In the Cox PH model, the inclusion of …xed e¤ects results in a shift of the baseline hazard function. The country …xed e¤ects, c , control for a wide array of observable and unobservable characteristics of the exporting countries that might a¤ect the chances of their products to survive in the US market. These include factors like physical and cultural proximity to the USA, common border, common language etc. The time …xed e¤ects, t 0 , control for the possibility that the initial conditions in the …rst year of exports might in ‡uence the products' chances for subsequent survival in the US market.
Furthermore, we allow the shape of the baseline hazard function, h j (t), to vary across industries, or even products, by …tting a strati…ed Cox PH model. Strati…cation according to an indicator variable k adds more ‡exibility to the model and allows for di¤erential e¤ect of the regressors across product groups. In equation (1), the strata variable is industry indicator j, allowing the baseline hazard function, h j (t), to vary across 118 industries according to the ISIC 4-digit classi…cation.
We also stratify the Cox PH model according to the product indicator variable k:
This stringent speci…cation allows for a di¤erent baseline hazard function, h k (t), for every of the 4562 analyzed products from the HS 6-digit classi…cation. Because our measure of …nancial development varies at the country-time level 10 , we report in all tables robust standard errors clustered at the country-time level as well, in order to avoid biasing the standard errors downwards. 11 The coe¢ cients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, as they measure the e¤ect of a change in the 10 Time being the year of the initiation of the export spell. 11 Failure to account for clustering may lead to massive underestimation of standard errors and consequent over-rejection of null hypothesis. In our case, the possibility of clustered standard errors may remain even after controlling for …xed e¤ects (Bertrand et al. 2004 ). We have also experimented with the two-way clustering following the procedure by Cameron et al. (2006) . The idea there is based on three variance matrices: the …rst one is computed using clustering according to country, the second one is based on clustering according to time and the third one uses clustering alongside country-time dimension. The …nal variance matrix is the sum of …rst and second matrix, minus the third one. In our case the resulting matrix is negative, suggesting that there might actually be no need to cluster in more than one dimension (Cameron et al. 2006 , p. 9).
right-hand side variables on the log of the hazard rate. As in standard OLS, the identi…cation of our main coe¢ cient, 2 , relies on the assumption of orthogonality between the interaction term and the residual. Available credit in the economy expands in anticipation of future growth opportunities. Thus, using the level of credit to GDP as a proxy for …nancial development may introduce a potential endogeneity bias. However, the bias should not be signi…cant, given our variable on the left-hand side is the length of the trade relationships and not the annual volume of export. Additionally, we take all explanatory variables, including the level of …nancial development, at the initiation of the trade relationship.
Finally, if a product k exported by country c appears more than once in the dataset, it exhibits what is referred to as multiple spells of service. These multiple spells within a given trade relationship represent 52% of our observations and may not be independent. The …rst exit can make the second one more likely to occur. Inversely, an exporter might learn from the initial failure and manages to survive longer in a subsequent trade relationship. We therefore include a dummy variable to account for higher order spells.
Empirical Results
In Table 1 , we take a …rst look at the interplay between disciplinary pressures from product markets and external debtholders towards exporting patterns congruent with the idea of comparative advantage. The dependent variable is the probability of exiting the US market (hazard rate, in the terminology of survival analysis) for product k exported from country c. All regressions control for country and time …xed e¤ects. The estimations in Table 1 allow for di¤erent baseline hazard across industries by de…ning industry as strata variable (Equation 1).
[ Table 1 about here]
The …rst column focuses on the disciplining impact of product markets. Here the variable of interest is the distance of exported product from the comparative advantage of the country of origin (distance ck ). The positive and signi…cant impact of this variable on the hazard rate con…rms the importance of a competitive foreign market in enforcing an optimal allocation of resources. Products with factor intensity far away from endowment of the exporting country face a signi…cantly higher probability of failure in the US market. Moving to our control variables, the value of export to the US (initial_export ck ) and the total value of exports to all destination markets (total_export ck ) in the initial year of export spell both decrease the hazard rate. Intuitively, products survive longer on the US market when the importers are willing to accept a higher initial shipment and when the exporting country has experience with placing the products in other markets as well. The coe¢ cient for the multiple spell dummy (multiple_spell ck ) is positive and signi…cant, suggesting a higher risk of failure for products that repeatedly exit and re-enter the US market. The last product-related variable (N Suppliers k ) has a negative impact on the hazard rate. This result is rather counter-intuitive, as the number of exporting countries serving the US market with given product should proxy for the strength of foreign competition. The e¤ect of the GDP per capita of the exporting country (GDP c ) has no signi…cant e¤ect in this speci…cation.
The second column of Table 1 is our baseline speci…cation. It examines whether domestic …nancial intermediaries provide an additional check on ine¢ cient exporting. The regressors now also include the ratio of private credit over GDP in the exporting country (F D c ) and an interaction term between this measure and the distance of exported product to the exporting country's comparative advantage (F D c distance ck ). Strong …nancial intermediaries should in general help the exporters to survive on foreign markets. Domestic …nancial development (F D c ) indeed somewhat lowers the hazard rate, but this direct e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. By contrast, the interaction term between …nance and distance to comparative advantage (F D c distance ck ) has a positive and statistically signi…-cant impact on the hazard rate. The same applies for the direct e¤ect of distance to comparative advantage (distance ck ). Interpreting both coe¢ cients together, external debtholders push the exporters to abandon products that are facing an uphill battle on a foreign market due to suboptimal use of the domestic factor endowment. With regard to our control variables, GDP per capita of the exporting country now has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the hazard rate. This result might appear counter-intuitive at …rst sight. However, two features of our estimations strategy provide an explanation. First, we control for country …xed e¤ects in all regressions. The e¤ect of GDP is thus identi…ed solely from variations within countries over time. These variations emerge both from growth trend and from business cycle ‡uctuations. Second, we measure all time-varying regressors in the …rst year of trade relationships. Economically, the positive estimated coe¢ cient for GDP c would then imply that exports initiated at the peak of a business cycle face higher risk of failure. Possible reasons for this e¤ect include over-con…dence of exporters during a boom or di¢ culties to maintain the costly presence in foreign markets once the business climate at home deteriorates. The next three columns control for additional channels a¤ecting the survival on foreign markets that could be correlated with our mechanism.
In the third column, we add interaction terms between exporting countries' factor endowments and the sectors' corresponding factor intensities. This controls for the possibility that products from industries extensively using physical or human capital survive longer on foreign markets if the exporting country is abundant in such a capital. When adding these interaction terms, we also control for direct e¤ect of countries' factor endowments ( c , h c ), while the direct e¤ect of factor intensities (CapInt j , HumInt j ) is captured by the industry strata e¤ects. 12 Our main interaction term capturing the disciplining e¤ects of external debtholders (F D c distance ck ) maintains a positive and statistically signi…-cant coe¢ cient. Similarly, the direct e¤ect of distance to comparative advantage (distance ck ) still translates into a higher hazard rate of exports, con…rming the disciplining impact of a competitive foreign market. The human capital interaction term (h c HumInt j ) has the expected negative sign, while the direct e¤ects of factor endowments are insigni…cant. The physical capital interaction ( c CapInt j ) has a positive sign, suggesting that products of capital-intensive industries coming from capital-abundant countries face a higher risk of exit from a foreign market. This rather counter-intuitive result is similar to Manova (2008) who …nds a negative e¤ect of this interaction term on export volume. In the fourth column, we control for an alternative channel from …nance to export survival. The seminal paper of Rajan and Zingales (1998) Another bias might arise due to high correlation between countries'…nancial and overall economic development. Rather than the disciplining e¤ects of external debtholders, our main interaction term (F D c distance ck ) can simply represent the impact of some unobservable feature of rich countries that prevents ine¢ cient resource use for unpromising exports. In the …fth column of Table 1 , we therefore control for the interaction term of product's distance to comparative advantage with exporting country's GDP per capita (GDP c distance ck ). This new variable turns out to be not signi…cant. However, our two main variables capturing the disciplining e¤ects of product markets and external debtholders (distance ck , F D c distance ck ) lose their signi…cance as well. Our controls in Table 1 are thus not su¢ cient to enable a clear-cut identi…cation of various disciplining forces a¤ecting the export survival, while controlling for the highly correlated levels of …nancial and economic development. To address this problem we are going to examine the disciplining e¤ects of foreign product markets and domestic debtholders within a more stringent econometric speci…cation. Table 2 presents the results of such a rigorous speci…cation. The strata variable is not any more the industry corresponding to exported product, but the product itself. This allows for a di¤erent baseline hazard function for every of the 4,562 products included in the estimation (Equation 2). In other respects, the …ve columns correspond to the estimations from Table 1. [ Table 2 about here] Concerning our main focus on the interplay between disciplining forces of foreign product markets and domestic debtholders, the …rst four columns con…rm in qualitative terms the results from Table 1 . Both distance to the comparative advantage (distance ck ) and the interaction of this variable with the …nancial development in the country of origin (F D c distance ck ) maintain positive and signi…cant impact on the hazard rate of products exported to the USA. Quantitatively, the point estimate and level of signi…cance for the main interaction term increase after controlling for product strata e¤ects.
The main qualitative di¤erence occurs in the …fth column that controls for the interaction between distance to comparative advantage and economic development in the exporting country (GDP c distance ck ). In contrast to Table 1 , the main interaction term capturing the disciplining impact of external debtholders (F D c distance ck ) now has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on a product's exit probability in the US market. However, the distance to comparative advantage (distance ck ) still fails to a¤ect the hazard rate in a signi…cant way. These results provide a strong support for the relevance of Jensen's free cash ‡ow theory in the context of resource misallocation due to ine¢ cient export patterns. Between a competitive foreign market and external debtholders, the latter seem to be the more robust force behind pushing the exporting sector towards an e¢ cient use of available factors of production. The interaction of distance to comparative advantage with the GDP per capita (GDP c distance ck ) is also insigni…cant. This provides additional support for our theoretical channel. It is the disciplining impact of banking system rather than some general feature of rich countries that prevents resource misallocation in form of exports not matching the factor endowment of the domestic economy.
The stringent econometric speci…cation underlying Table 2 also yields two changes regarding our control variables. First, the proxy for the strength of foreign competition on the US market (N Suppliers k ) now has the expected positive sign, increasing the products'hazard rate. Second, …nancial development (F D c ) now has a signi…cantly negative direct e¤ect on the hazard rate in the second and third column. However, this signi…cance disappears once we control for an interaction between industries'dependence on external …nance and countries'…-nancial development (ExF j F D c ) in the last two columns. This could suggest that the disciplining in ‡uence of the external debtholders (F D c distance ck ) and their support for …nancially vulnerable industries (ExF j F D c ) already account for the greater part of …nancial forces a¤ecting products'survival on foreign markets. However, we do not want to push too strong for such an interpretation. We identify the direct impact of …nancial development namely from variations within countries over time due to the presence of country …xed e¤ects in our speci…cations.
Our theoretical motivation stresses the disciplining in ‡uence of debtholders as the channel through which …nance prevents misallocation of resources. We have therefore chosen the ratio of private credit over GDP as our measure of …nancial development. Table 3 further con…rms the relevance of our theoretical reasoning. Here we repeat the estimations of columns (2) to (4) of Table 2 , but in the main interaction term we replace the private credit over GDP with the ratio of stockmarket capitalization over GDP. A positive coe¢ cient for the resulting variable (StM c distance ck ) would suggest that shareholders are also able to prevent managers from exports violating the principle of comparative advantage. The results in Table 3 do not support this hypothesis. The interaction term between stockmarket capitalization and distance to comparative advantage is never signi…cant and sometimes even enters the regression with the wrong sign. The comparison between Tables 2 and 3 thus con…rms the pivotal disciplining role of external debtholders. 13 [ Table 3 about here] Table 4 provides a series of robustness checks to our main results. The point of departure is the …fth column of Table 2 that has so far represented our most stringent speci…cation. In the …rst column of Table 4 , we drop all observations from islands often specializing in exports of only a few products (see Appendix B for details). The reported results are qualitatively the same as in the last column of Table 2 . In particular, the debtholders (F D c distance ck ) still seem to be the dominant disciplining factor preventing long-term resource misallocation in form of ine¢ cient export patterns. The impacts of both competition on the US product market (distance ck ) and economic development in the exporting country (GDP c distance ck ) are not signi…cant. Our results are thus not driven by small countries in the sample.
Columns (2) to (4) of Table 4 examine the robustness of our results to alternative ways of computing the proxy for distance of product k from comparative advantage of exporting country c. In the second column, we replace the Euclidean distance with the absolute distance.
14 The results remain qualitatively the same.
In the third and fourth column, we add arable land per worker as a third production factor when computing the distance to comparative advantage. We use Euclidean distance in column (3) and absolute distance in column (4). Adding the third production factor further increases the signi…cance for our main interaction term (F D c distance ck ). At the same time the direct e¤ect of distance to comparative advantage on hazard rate of exports (distance ck ) remains insigni…cant.
In the …fth column of Table 4 , we strengthen our control of omitted variables. Speci…cally, we stratify the Cox PH model according to product-time indicator variable ( k = k t 0 ). The baseline hazard function h kt 0 (t) can now di¤er even for the same product k; if the export spells started at di¤erent time t 0 . This controls for the possibility that the initial conditions in the US product market vary both across products and time. These initial conditions can a¤ect the products' chances for subsequent survival. A typical example is the degree of competition on the US market in the initial year of trade relationships proxied by N Suppliers k . The product-time strata e¤ects capture the e¤ect of this variable as well as of all other possibly unobservable product-speci…c initial conditions on the US product market. The results for our two main variables (F D c distance ck , distance ck ) re-main unchanged by this additional stringency of the estimation. The signi…cance for our main interaction term (F D c distance ck ) is now even higher compared to the last column of Table 2 .
[ Table 4 about here]
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence for the allocative and disciplining role of …nance. Banks do not promote export in a sweeping non-discriminate way. They rather push the exporting sectors towards the optimal use of countries' factor endowments, in compliance with the idea of comparative advantage. A well-developed …nancial system can thus enforce an e¢ cient export composition before a competitive foreign market does so. In this way, …nance prevents ine¢ cient export patterns with positive impact on national and international allocation of available resources.
These results entail some interesting policy implications. According to the conventional wisdom, export promotion serves as a remedy for the prevailing …-nancial frictions. In the absence of government interventions, the argument goes, capital market imperfections might prevent …rms from exploiting potentially good export opportunities. If the aim is to improve the short-run export performance of credit-constrained …rms, then traditional export promotion might indeed be a good substitute for …nancial development. It is less clear whether government can replace the role that …nance plays in pushing the country's export composition toward its comparative advantage. If the …nancially vulnerable …rms disproportionately use inappropriate factors of production, export promotion might even reinforce ine¢ cient export patterns and worsen the resource allocation.
Governments eager to promote exports might therefore consider supporting …nancial development …rst. A strong domestic …nancial system would then provide the right incentives for the manufacturing sector to focus on exports that are sustainable in the long-run. This approach could dominate both the across-theboard export promotion and the trials to pick up the winners on foreign markets directly by the government. The dependent variable is the hazard rate on the US market for a export relationship of product k from country c and industry j. All regressions are estimated using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972 ) and control for country and time …xed e¤ects. Estimations also allow for di¤erent baseline hazard across industries by de…ning industry j as strata variable. Our main variables of interest are (distance ck ): distance of product k from comparative advantage of exporting country c, and (FD c *distance ck ): interaction between this variable and …nancial development in country c proxied by private credit over GDP (FD c ). The control variables include direct and interacted e¤ects of GDP per capita of country c (GDP c ), dependence of industry j on external …nance (ExF j ), countries´s endowments of physical ( c ) and human capital (h c ), corresponding factor intensities at industry level (CapInt j , HumInt j ), initial export value to the USA (initial_export ck ), total export value to the world market (total_export ck ), number of countries exporting product k to the USA (NSuppliers k ), and a dummy variable taking value one if the spell is a higher order spell (multiple_spell ck ). All time-varying explanatory variables are measured in the initial year of the trade relationship. Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is the hazard rate on the US market for a export relationship of product k from country c and industry j. All regressions are estimated using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972 ) and control for country and time …xed e¤ects. Estimations also allow for di¤erent baseline hazard across products by de…ning product k as strata variable. The variables are de…ned in Table 1 . Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is the hazard rate on the US market for a export relationship of product k from country c and industry j. All regressions are estimated using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972 ) and control for country and time …xed e¤ects. Estimations also allow for di¤erent baseline hazard across products by de…ning product k as strata variable. Financial development of country c is captured by the ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP (StM c ) rather than private credit over GDP Other variables are de…ned in Table 1 . Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is the hazard rate on the US market for a export relationship of product k from country c and industry j. All regressions are estimated using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972) . Estimations in columns
(1) to (4) control for country and time …xed e¤ects and allow for di¤erent baseline hazard across products by de…ning product k as strata variable. Estimation in column (5) controls for country …xed e¤ects and de…nes product*time as strata variable. Column (1) drops observations from islands specializing in export of only few products, columns (2) to (4) examine robustness to alternative ways of computing (distance ck ): distance of product k from comparative advantage of exporting country c. The variables are de…ned in Table 1 . Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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